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ACCOMPLICE.

Admission as Witness-Exemption from Prosecution.-Theadmission
of an accopiplice as a witness for the government upon implied promise
of pardon, in any case, is not at the pleasure of the public prosecutor,
but rests in the sound judicial discretion of the court: 'Wight v. Rinds.
koff, 43 Wis.
If an accomplice in one crime'be also indicted for another, and the
fact be within the knowledge of the court, he will not, in general, be admitted as a witness; but, if admitted, though he testify in good faith
against his accomplices upon one indictment, he will be put upon his
trial on the other, and punished upon conviction: Id.
An agreement of the public prosecutor, unsanctioned by the court (if
such sanction could be given in such a case), for immunity or clemency
to several defendants, in several indiqtments, upon one of them becoming
a witness for the prosecution upon still other indictments, would be a
fraud upon the court, and an obstruction of public justice: 11.
A witness, as such, cannot have an attorney; anZ1 though an accomplice may act. by advice of his attorney on the question whether he will
become a witness for the prosecution, when he once becomes such a witness, the relation of attorney and client ceases quoad hoc : Id.
AGENT.

Agent to sell-Implied .Powers.-An agent authorized to sell goods
on commission has no implied power to barter or exchange them, or to
pledge them for his own debt. He may receive payment in the ordinary
modes of business, but cannot change the security for goods sold, or
make himself the debtor of his principal in lieu of the purchaser:
Wheeler & Wilson Maniifacturing Co. v. Givan, 65 Mo.
In suit upon a note given for the purchase-money of a sewing machine bought of plaintiff's agent, it is no defence that the maker has
furnished board to the agent in payment of the note under an agreement made at the time of the sale, where it appears that the maker had
motice that the agent was not authorized to make such agreement and
the plaintiff never consented to it: Id.
ATTORNEY.

See Contract; Esto

.e.

BANKRUPTCY.

Stay of ,Suit.-As a bankrupt may waive a disehare when sued beI Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions

filed during Oct. Term 1877. The cases will probably be reported in 5 or 6 Otto.
2From John Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 44 Connecticut Reports.
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5 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 43 Wisconsin Reports.
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fore his final discharge, if he wishes to stay proeecdings. until the question of his discliarge is determined he must plead the proveedin._,s in
bankruptcy, or bring them to the knowledge of the court in a proper
manner. On suits originating belore justices of the peace. this may
be done by motion based on a transcript of the proceeding in l'ankruptcy: Biolden v. Sherwood, 84 Il:
CO3M1ON

CARRIERS.

Excuse for deh in transit of Goos- 1s major.-In a suit aprainst
a railroad company for damages resulting from delay in the transit of
freight, it is competent for the company to show that the delay was
caused solely by the lawless, irresistible violence of men who were not
in the employment of the railroad company : Pittsburgh, Ft. IUgnc &
Chicago Railroad 0o. v. ilazen, 84 111.
Limiting Lilabilit.-The carrier miy limit its obligation to carry
safely over its own lines, or only to points reached by its own carriages,
and for safe storage and delivery to the next carrier in the route beyond,
although the goods arc marked to a point beyond its line. A clause in
the receipt given the owner for the goods, so restricting the carrier's obligation, if understandingly assented to by the shipper, will as effectually
bind him as if he had signed it: Eric l1uihca, (0. v. lWilcox, 84 111.
CONFISCATION _kCT.

Pardon-E/cct on sales of" Property and r1agrnent into the Uhnited
States Treasury-Thea the Mtted States are liable in th.e (burt of
Clains.-The general pardon and amnesty granted by President Johnson,
by proclamation of December 25th 1868, do not entitle one receiving
their benefits to the proceeds of his property, previously condemned and
sold under the Confiscation Act of 1862, after such proceeds have been
paid into the treasury of"the United States: .Kwote v. 11ited States, S.
C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
Whilst a full pardon releases the offender from all disabilities imposed
by the offence pardoned, and restores to him all his civil riglhts, it does
not affect any rights which have vested in others directly by the execution of the judgment for the offence, or which have been acquired by
others whilst that judgment was in force. And if the proceeds of the
property of the offender sold under the judgment have been paid into
the treasury, the right to them has so far become vested in the United
States that they can only be recovered by him through an Act of Congress. MIoneys once in the treasury can only be withdrawn by an appropriation by law: Id.
To constitute an implied contract with the United States for the payment of money upon which an action will lie in the Court of Claims,
tlire must have been some consideration moving to the United States,
or they must have received the money charged with a duty to pay it
over, or the claimadt must have had a lawful right to it when it was received, as in the case of money paid by mistake. No such implied contract with the United States arises with respect to moneys received into
the treasury as the proceeds of property forfeited and sold under the
Confiscation Act of July 17th 1862: 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
See Municipal Corporation.
Sale of Estate without consent of Remaindermen.-Certain real estate
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was devised to A. for life, and after her death upon certain contingencies
to B. and others. The General Assembly, upon the petition of A., and
against the remonstrance of B. and others, passed a resolution authorizing a sale of the real estate by certain trustees named, and the holding and investing by them of the proceeds for the benefit of all parties
Ield, to be constiinterested, according to their respective interests.
tutional and valid : Linsley et al. v. t1ubbard et al., 44 Conn.
CONTRACT.

Against Public Policy.-Courts will always refuse to enforce contracts
which are contrary to public morality or policy, whenever and however
in actions upon them, that fact may be made to appear: Wight v. Rindskop. , 43 Wis.
While several indictments were pending in a federal court against
defendant and six other persons for violation of the revenue laws, plaintiff told defendant that his relations with the prosecuting attorneys were
such that he thought he could render these parties essential service.
Thereupon it was agreed between defendant and plaintiff that the former
should give evidence for the United States, under the counsel and direction of the latter, against persons other than those included in the agreement, against whom still other indictments for violation of the revenue
laws were pending in the same court; and plaintiff undertook that
defendant and the other six persons above mentioned should be permitted severally to plead guilty to those counts only, in the several indictments against them, involving the least punishment and receive upon
those the lowest punishment of the law; and for this service, if successful, defendant was to pay plaintiff a large sum for each person mentioned.
The agreement required no disclosure, evidence or other aid to the government from any other person than defendant and did not require him
to make full disclosure to the prosecuting attorheys, or to put himself in
their hands as their witness. 1eld, that the services on plaintiff's part
thus stipulated for, were not within the legitimate scope of a professional
retainer of an attorney-at-law, and a contract therefor is void as against
public morality and policy: Id.
The mere fact that the judgments of the federal court on the indictments were such as to fulfil plaintiff's agreement, will not warrant this
court in assuming that such agreement was sanctioned by that court;
nor could it hold the agreement valid even upon that assumption: Id.
See Evidence; Sheriff.
See Confiscation.Act.
See Husband and Wife.

CORPORATION.

COURT OF CLAIMS.
COURTS.

CRIMINAL LAW.

Practice-Tra--Presenceof Prisoner.- Unless it affirmatively ap
pears from the record in a criminal case, that the prisoner was present
during the progress of the trial, and at the rendition of the verdict, a
judgment against him will be reversed: State v. Able, 65 Mo.
Accomplice-Murder.-Mere approval by a bystander of a murder',
committed in his presence does not make him an accomplice ; and an
instruction to the jury that if the defendant was "present, aiding or
abetting or counselling or inciting or encouraging or approving" the act,
is error for which the court must reverse and award a new trial : State
v. Cox, 65 Mo.
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DAMAGES.

See Officer.

Coven ant against Encumbrances-Damagesfor breach-Wherc land
is sold with a covenant against encumbrances, and an encumbrance exists of a permanent character, which impairs the value of the premies,
and cannot be removed as a matter of right by the purchaser, the damages will be measured by the diminished value of the premises : MitchelI v. Stanley, 44 Conn.
The defendants conveyed to the plaintiffs, with a covenant against
encumbrances, a tract of land on which there was the following encumbrance : a company owning a canal on which the land abutted, had,
by a deed of a former owner, thd right to pass and repass upon the land
along the canal within two rods of the canal bank, fbr the purpose of
cleaning and repairing the canal, upon paying the owner reasonable
damage. In an action for a breach of the covenant, it was found that
the actual damage from the exercise of the right to the time of suit
was $10, but that the land was worth $750 less by reason of the encumbrance. .iel,, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover $750 : Id.
DEED.

Boundary- Warranty- Quantity QI' Land.-The defendant conveyed
to the plaintiff by warranty deed a tract of land described as bounded
"North on F. street 189 feet, east on land of P. 147 feet, south on
lands of W. and P., in all 189 feet, and west on land of W. 147 feet."
The distance ,betwcen the land of P. on the east and that of W. on the
west was only 184 feet. In an action for breach of the defendant's covenant that he was seised of the land described, it was Held,
1. That parol evidence was not admissible on the part of the plaintiff,
that the defendant, at the time the deed was executed, proposed to describe the north and south lines as " 190 feet more or less," and that
the plaintiff refused to accept a deed so drawn and told the defendant to
was willing to warrant, and that the
fix on such a number of feet as heabove.
as
defendant then drew the deed
2 That the description of the land as bounding on P. on the east and
on W. on the west was to be regarded as one of greater certainty than
their length, and that
the description of thli- north and south lines
latter.
theby
therefore the former description controlled
3. That the deed therefore did not show a clear intent to convey exactly 189 feet of land, and that consequently the covenant of seisin was
not to be taken as applying to that quantity: Elliott v. Weed, 44 Conn.
EQUITY.

Establishing Title by Estoppel.-A court of equity has jurisdiction to
establish a title to real estate by estoppel against a former owner, who
by his acts and representations, has induced another to purchase from
his grantee under a void deed : Wade v. Bunn, 84 Ill.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.

New Trial-ew Evidence before the Appellate Court.-The Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction to revise the action of an inferior court upon
the question of granting or refusing a new trial, and the final judgment
of such court cannot be examined through its rulings upon that question. If, when the final judgment is brought here for review by writ
of error, no other documents are presented for cbnsideratiom than such
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as were before the inferior court upon the application for a new trial,
this court cannot look into them, and if error is not otherwise disclosed
by the record, the judgment will be affirmed : Kerr et al v. Clampitt
eta l, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
This court must have befre it a bill of exceptions. or what is equivalent to such a bill, upon which the final judgment of the court below.
was reviewed, or it will not examine into any alleged errors except such
as arc otherwise apparent on the face of the record : Id.
ESTOPPEL.

See Equity.

Title-Attorney at Law.-llaintiffs having bought a lot, relying upon
the opinion of defendant, an attorney at law, that the title was good,
subsequently sold the lot to defendant on credit, giving him a bond for
tifle, and at his request erected a building on it, of which he took and
kept possession. In a suit to recover the price of the lot and house,
Beld, that defendant was estopped by these flcts to show that plaintiffs
had acquired no title to the lot: Soward et al. v. Johnston, 65 Mo.
EVIDENCE.

Fitness cannot testi/y to conclusion of Liw.-Where two parties are
sued as joint feasors, and a default is taken against one and the other
pleads not guilty, it is not competent to permit the one in default to testify that he alone is responsible for the alleged tort: Iloener v. Koch, 84
Ills.
To show to cwhom Goods were really sold- Cbrporation-AgentParol evidence is admissible to show that goods charged by the plaintiffs
to B. were intended for, and sold upon the credit of, a corporation of
which he was -agent, and that the corporation received the goods and
credited the plaintiffs for them : Xorthford Rivet Co. v. Blackman Manvfacturing Co., 44 Conn.
The plaintiffs took the individual note of B. on account of the goods,
Ield, that
but it was not given or taken as payment of the account.
this did not discharge the liability of the corporation : Id.
B. having gone into bankruptcy, the plaintiffs presented the note
against his estate and received a dividend upon it. Held, that they
might show that they did this under the advice of legal counsel, and
upon an opinion given that it would not prejudice their claim against
the corporation : Rd.
GUARANTY.

See Tdunicipal Corporation.
HIGHWAY.

City-Duty in respect of Sidewalks.-A city is bound only to the exercise of reasonable prudence and diligence in the construction of a step
from a higher to a lower sidewalk, and is not required to foresee and
provide against every possible danger or accident that may occur. It
is only required to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe
condition, and is not an insurer against accidents: City of Chicago v.
Bixby, 84 Ills.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Divorce-Alimony.-Courts in this country possess, in actions for divorce, only the power conferred by statute: Bacon,v. Bacon, 43 Wis.
The power of rourts in this state, in such actions, to divest the husband of the title to realty in favor of the wife, rests entirely on sect. 29,
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oh. 111, Rev. Stats., as construed in Donovan v. Donoran. 20 Wis. 5SG.
and subsequent cases*: id.
Alniony is not an estate, nor part of the husband's estate assigned to
the wife as her own, but an allowance, annual or in gross, out of the
husband's estate, for the nourishment of the wife; and the court granting
it may from time to time revise its judgment, and render such new
judgment as it might originally have made, in respect thereto : .Td.
Except in cases coming within some statutory power, the courts of
this state possess no power to revise their judgments after the term at
which they are rendered: Id.
In sect. 28, ch. Ill, Rev. Stats., which authorizes the court, after
judgment " for alimony or other allowance for the wife and children,"
to revise and alter it, the word allowance denotes, like alimony, a continued provision for nourishment, and appears to refer to such a provision for the children ; the power there granted is inapplicable to a judgment for the division of real property under sect. 29 ; and such a judgment cannot be revised after the term. Campbell v. Canpbell, 37 Wis.
206, and Hopkins v. Roykins, 40 Id. 462, as to this point, adhered to: rd.
INSANITY.

Responsibilityfor Acts. -When the mind is so deranged that a person
cannot comprehend and understand the effect and consequences of an
act, or the business in which he may be engaged, the law will relieve
him from his acts: but so long as lie is possessed of the requisite mental faculties to transact rationally the ordinary affairs of life, lie will not
be relieved from the responsibility that rests on the ordinary citizen:
Titcomb v. Vantfle, 84 Ills.
INSURANCE.

P,'emium, Note-Failure to pay Instalment-Susension of RiskPolicy to re-attach on Payment.-Where the charter of an insurance
compmny provides that the whole of a premium note payable in instalment-s shall become due upon failure to pay any instalment for thirty
days after notice given to the maker of the default and the penalties
incurred under the charter by reason thereof; and by the charter and
a policy issued thereunder, such failure does not absolutely avoid the
policy, bat suspends it so that the company is not liable for a loss occurring during the continuance of such defaflt, but upon the payment of
the note (whether voluntarily or enforced) the policy revives and re-attaches, iAisuch case the company may recover the full amount of the
note, and not m3rely such part as would bear the same proportion to the
full amount as that portion of the period of the risk prior to the notice
of default bears to the entire period covered by the policy. Upon payment of the full amount the insured becomes the owner of a paid-up
policy for the remainder of the original term: American Ins. Co. v.
Klink, 65 Mo.
JUDGMENT. See Hunsband and 117fe.
Can only bind Property within the jurisdiction,of the Cout.-A decree rendered against parties who are beyond the litnits of the state
upon constructive notice by publication under the Illinois statute, can
only affect property within the jurisdiction of the court. T'he person
cannot be bound, unless it has been reached by the process of the curt,
and as the decree cannot operate extra-territorially, it is impossible that
it can bind property thus located : Harriset al.v. 1nllman ct al, 8 4 Ills.
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LImITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Tacking
to run, no
whoim it is
ties cannot

Disabilities.-Wherea statute of limitation has once begun
subsequent or supervening disability in the party against
taking effect will arrest its operation. Cumulative disabilitherefore be regarded : Keil v. Hlealey, 84 I1.
MANDAMUS.

See Office.

MILITARY OFFICER.

See Officer.

See Eighwuy.
Guaranty--Construction of-Power of Legislature to inpose Liabilities on a .Nunicipaml Cbrportion-RetroactiveLaws.-Where an ordinance of a city authorizing a contract with a gas company, and the issue
to it of bonds of the city provided that the company should "guarantee
the said bonds and assume the payment of the principal thereof at maturity :" Ield, 1. That the guaranty embraced both the principal and
interest of the bonds ; and, 2. That the or.dinance. contemplated two
undertakings by the company, one to the bondholder and one to the
city. The guaranty was to 'be for the security of the bondholder; it was
to be an undertaking to answer for the city's liability. The other undertaking was to be for the security of the city by placing the company
under obligation to provide for the payment of the principal of the
bonds on their maturity, an obligation which otherwise would not have
existed: Jefferson City Gas-Light Co. v. Clark and City of Znew Orleans,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
The endorsement by the president of the company on the bonds guaranteeing "the payment of the principal and interest" thereof was a substantial compliance with the provision of the ordinance and contract as
to the guaranty: I t.
It is competent for the legislature to impose upon a city the payment
of claims just in themselves, for which an equivalent has been received,
but which from some irregularity or omission in the proceedings by which
they were created cannot be enforced at law : Id.
A law requiring a municipal corporation to pay such a claim is not
within the constitutional provision inhibiting the passage of a retroactive
law: Id.
MIUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

NEaLIGENCE.

Railroad-.A'eglect to Whistle at Street Crossing--Contrbutpry.Aregligence of Party h!Jured.-The neglect of the engineer of a locomotive
of a railroad train to sound its whistle or ring its bell on approaching a
street crossing, does not relieve a party from the necessity of taking
ordinary precautions for his safety. He is bound to use his senses-to
listen and to look-before attempting to cross the railroad track, in order
to avoid any possible accident from an approaching train. If he omit to
use them, and walk thoughtlessly upon the track, he is guilty of culpable
negligence, and if he receive any injury, he so far contributes to it as
to deprive him of any right to complain. If using them he sees the
train coming, and undertakes to cross the track, instead of waiting for
the train to pass, and is injured, the consequences of his mistake and
temerity cannot be ca&t upon the railroad company. If one chooses in
such a position to take risks he must bear the possible consequences of
Island and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Houston, S.
failure: ( hicaqo, Rock
Term 1877.
C. U. S., Oct.
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To instruct upon assumed facts to which no evidence applies is errbr.
Such instructions tend to mislead the jury by withdrawing their attention from the proper points involved in the issue : I.
Railroads-Danqeroits Crossing- T7gilance rquired of Company
and the Il'abli.-Where a railroad company has a dangerous crossing
in a crowded city, it must exercise a degree of care to avoid injuring
persons and property commensurate with the danger of accident; on
the other hand, persons using such a crossing must exercise care and
watchfulness commensurate with the danger to which they are exposed:
Harlan,v. St. Louis, Kansas City C-Northern Railway 0o., 65 .o.
The fact that defendant has been guilty of negligence, followed by an
accident, does not make him liable for the resulting injury, unless that
was occasioned by the negligence: Id.
Notwithstanding the injured party may have been guilty of contributory negligence, a railroad company is still liable for the injury if it
could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care on the
part of the company after discovery of the danger in which the injured
party stood, or if the company failed to discover the danger through its
own recklessness or carelessness, when the exercise of ordinary care
would have discovered it and averted the calamity : Id.
Where the undisputed evidence showed that the negligence of the
deceased contributed directly to produce his death, and that it was not
possible after he placed himself in danger to prevent the accident, the
railroad company is not liable: Id.
NEW TRIAL.

See Errors and Appeals.

OFFICE AND OFFICER.

Defacto-'Vacancy-Mandamus-Quo Warranto.-An office is not
vacant when there is a de facto incumbent : 1harrison et al. v. Shnonds
et al., 44 Conn.
Such incumbent must be ousted upon an information in the nature of
a quo warranto, before the court will grant a mandamus to compel proceedings for filling the office: Id.
And the court will not grant a mandamus where it appears that the
object sought could have been secured without serious difficulty without
the aid of the court : Id.
Military Offier-Justificationof Trespass by orders-IndianTerritory
-Damages -All the country described by the first section of the Act
of June 30th 1834 (4 U. S. Statutes 729), as Indian country, remains
Indian country so long as the Indians retain their title to the soil, and
ceases to be Indian country whenever they lose that title, in the absence
of any different provision by treaty or by act of Congress: Bates et al.
v. Clark et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1677.
Whatever may be the rule in time of war, and in the presence of
actual hostilities, military officers can no more protect themselves in time
of peace than civilians for wrongs committed under orders emanating
from a source which is itself without authority in the premises. Hence
a military officer seizing liquors supposed to be in Indian country when
they are not, is liable to an action as a trespasser : Id.
The difference between the value of the goods so seized, at the place
where they were taken and the place where they were returned to the
owners, is the proper measure of damages: Id.
PARDON.
See Confiscation Act.
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See Office.
.Aeqligence.
Ditty to furnish safe Mchnery.-It is the duty of railroad companies
to furnish good, *ell constructed machinery, adapted to the purposes of
its use, of good material and of the kind that is found to be safest when
applied to use; and whilst they are not required to seek and apply
every new invention, they must adopt such as is found by experience to
combine the greater safety with practical use: I. W. & W. Railway Co.
v. Asbury, 84 Ills.
Quo WARRANTO.
RAILROAD.

See

Sheriff interestdi-Process,Execution of- Coroner.-A sheriff who
owns stock in a corporation, has no such interest as will disqualify him,
either at common law or under the statute concerning coroners (Wag.
Stat. 284, § 3), from executing process in a ease to which the corporation is a party: Itardwic v. Jones ct al., 65 Mo.
A purchase by a corporation at execution sale is not void because the
sheriff conducting the sale is at the time a stockholder in the corporation : Id.
STATUTE.

Effect of Repeal on Actions for Penalty, &c.-To save pending actions
for statutory penalties, or pending prosecutions for statutory offences,
upon the repeal of the statute, an express saving of all penalties incurred
or offences committed under it, whether in the course of prosecution or
not, is essential: Rood v. The C., X. & St. P. Railway Co., 43 Wis.
SURETY.

Creditor'srelease of Securities-Effect of.-elease by a creditor of
part of the land mortgaged to him as security for payment of a bond,
does not dischlarge a surety in the bond, though made without his consent, if the remainder of the land is sufficient to indemnify him against
loss: Saline County v. Buie et al., 65 Mo.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.

Liability for acts of Co-trustee-Negligence- Fraud.-The questions,
how far one trustee will generally be held personally liable for the acts
and receipts of his co-trustee, and whether, in case of an executory
trust to joint trustees, they will be permitted to sever in their accounts,
discussed per RYAN, C. J., but not regarded as open in this case: Wilcox v. Bates, 43 Wis.
Trustees in possession are in general chargeable with actual receipts
only, except upon proof of gross negligence or of fraud in lessening or
concealing receipts; and a mere attempt by them to ignore the trust,
and deal with the property as their own, is not such a fraud as will
charge them beyond actual receipts; nor does it -tend to prove, but
rather to repel, negligence in the administration of the estate: Id.
Certificates of tax sales of trust property, with whatever purpose purchased or held by the trustee are always taken to be purchased and held
for the benefit of the estate; and the trustee can charge the estate only
with the amount paid and simple interest thereon, and not with the
statutory interest accruing on such certificates by way of penalty : Id.
UNITED STATES.

WITNESS.

See Confiscation Act.
See Accomplice.

